The European Journal

EU plans extended visa-free travel to Balkans

The European Commission has put forward a proposal to lift visa restrictions on Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro from 1st January 2010 following a comprehensive study of these countries’ adherence to the terms of the “White Schengen” list.

This proposal is in spite of the fact that only Macedonia was judged to be fully compliant with the demands of the list. Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia have a combined population of 10 million.

Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo have been excluded from this scheme as they have not made sufficient progress in the areas of border management, fighting organised crime and corruption, and respect for civil rights. This concession could be extended to Albania and Bosnia- Herzegovina if they adopt biometric passports in 2010. Bosnia has since launched a new biometric passport to be issued to citizens from 1 January 2010.

Olli Rehn, The EU Commissioner for Enlargement has stated, “The citizens of these countries will be able to visit family and friends in the European Union, as well as spending their holidays here without having to undergo lengthy visa procedures. In a nutshell, this will mean a further Europeanisation of the civil societies in the Western Balkans.”

The International Monetary Fund is considering a plan to provide aid programmes in the form of bailouts to countries who are struggling most due to the economic downturn – Macedonia is one of the 10 countries that has been suggested for this proposal. Serbia is also rumoured to be in desperate need of financial assistance.

Due to the hardships in their nations, there is every chance that Serbian and Macedonian citizens may not return after a vacation due to the bleak prospects at home.

A possible reason as to why this visa-free concession includes Serbia may rest with the South Stream pipeline project. The pipeline will connect Western Europe with the Russian Black Sea coast passing through Turkey before reaching Bulgaria. It will then split into two branches, one of which will pass through Serbia. Serbia could become a key player in the renewable energy sector with the renovation of the Kolobara power plant and new competition laws set for ratification by 2010. Serbia is strategically placed to become the gateway to the Balkans, with Belgrade viewed as the economic hub of the region. However, Serbia remains a cause for concern due to the question of Kosovo and war criminals, which may deter foreign companies from investing in the country. Regional disparity in Serbia may be accentuated as this visa-free proposal expressly excludes citizens of Kosovo.

Montenegro gains its main income from tourism, to which Russian holidaymakers contribute the majority of profits. As a result of this proposal, Montenegro may not seem as attractive to Russian visitors as they will be burdened with applying for visas to enter the country. This has wider implications as many Russian companies have relocated and set up casinos and other projects in Montenegro following the gambling ban that was enforced in Russia from 1st July 2009.

Although this proposal does not have major opposition in the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, European citizens have shown reluctance to the European project. Support for EU expansion is low amongst a significant proportion of European citizens in the bloc arguably due to increased fears of enhanced competition from Eastern Europe in the form of cheap labour and products, especially in the current economic climate of recession and increasing unemployment.

It can be argued that the most recent enlargement of the Union encompassing Bulgaria and Romania was unnecessarily rushed as neither country had made sufficient progress to tackle widespread corruption and organised crime.

The decision to extend this proposal to Serbia and Montenegro could set a worrying precedent as neither country satisfies the necessary conditions to be classed as official candidates for full membership. Visa-free travel may become a prerequisite to Union membership that candidate countries may use as a bargaining tool in the future.

Explaining the growth of the far right in the Euro-Elections

Bernadette Mill reports: Many extremist parties across Europe made substantial electoral gains in the recent polls for the European Parliament. They have improved upon 2004’s result by gaining an extra eight seats. The British National Party gained two seats in the North West and Yorskhire and the Humber regions respectively. The Party first made electoral progress when it gained three local council seats in Burnley. Its policies include paying non-white citizens to return to their countries of ethnic origin and full British withdrawal from the EU. In Holland, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom won four seats and came second in the polls. The Party is in favour of mass deportation of immigrants from the Netherlands, their leader has likened the Koran to Mein Kampf and his film, ‘Fitna’, which depicts Islam as a movement of terrorism and violence, has attracted widespread condemnation. In Austria, the Freedom Party, who formed coalition governments with the centre-right People’s Party in both 2000 and 2003, won 13.1 per cent of the vote with the Alliance for the Future of Austria gaining just under 5 per cent. Italy’s Northern League, who are part of the ruling coalition government, gained 9.5 per cent of the vote. The Hungarian Jobbik Party, led by Dr Krisztina Morvai and who also have a paramilitary wing, gained three seats. The party bears more than a passing resemblance to Hungary’s World War Two militia, the Arrow Cross, which caused the deaths of thousands of Hungarian Jews. They ran their campaign on a pledge to fight ‘Gypsy Crime’ and are overtly opposed to the Roma. The Nationalist Greater Romania Party gained two seats and the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party, who came third in the 2001 general elections, won 14.4 per cent of the votes which gave them two seats. The anti-gypsy Slovak National Party gained one seat whilst the Latvian electorate voted for the pro-Soviet Union candidate, Albert Rubiks. In Finland, the True Finns gained one seat whilst the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally won two seats. However, there were losses for extremist parties in France, Poland, Belgium, Bulgaria and Latvia.

It is arguable that the massive gains made by the Dutch far right were to be expected. In 2002, the party of the late Pim Fortuyn, Lijst Fortuyn came second in the general elections winning 26 seats. He formed the Party after being sacked from the Dutch far-right Liveable Netherlands Party for his unwavering stance on immigration.

There is a proven link between low-income and individuals with basic education and extreme voting practices. Workingclass voters have historically viewed immigrants as competition for jobs and social services, which explains why extremist parties have successfully played upon these insecurities. Societies with high unemployment and high levels of immigration are thought to be the most susceptible to rises in extremist voting patterns. The lower strata of society are most likely to perceive immigrants to be a threat and are most likely to scapegoat them for society’s ills by voting for an extremist party. Individuals who are not integrated into society are often in need of a substitute intermediary group – which far-right parties claim to fulfil through their nationalist agendas. The success of the far-right in Europe can be attributed to the current economic malaise. The Spanish Premier, Jose Zapatero’s party paid the price for the recession and the astronomical rate of unemployment in Spain. The farright electoral success amongst middle-class and affluent voters in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands, however, could be due to the fear inherent in this group of losing the prosperity they gained during more favourable economic times. Another reason for far-right success is that these parties have been led by charismatic leaders – Jorg Haider and Pim Fortuyn were able to attract voters who would not usually subscribe to their extremist policies. Their legacies have ensured the success of far-right parties in their respective countries.

There was surprise in Germany as Merkel’s Christian Democrats/Christian Socialists won 38 per cent of the vote despite an unfavourable economic forecast which could result in the nation emerging as the sick man of Europe. This result shows a display of confidence by the German electorate that Merkel is the best person to get them through the recession.

Politically dissatisfied individuals are more likely to reflect their disapproval by casting a vote against the mainstream parties. Far-right groups position themselves as protest parties thus attracting disgruntled members of the electorate. This was arguably the case in Britain where the British National Party was able to capitalise on the public condemnation of the recent MP’s expenses fiasco. It can also be inferred that people are less likely to vote for a party that seems to be poorly organised and overtly inflammatory – the BNP worked on changing its image to that of a more presentable party by ditching their army attire and opting for suits.

The success of parties who ran their campaigns on largely anti-immigration agendas must not be written off simply as a consequence of the perilous economic climate. It can be argued that their success is attributable to the European Union’s policy of free movement of people. The Schengen Convention which creates a bloc without borders, came into force when the Amsterdam Treaty was ratified in 1999. The United Kingdom and Ireland opted out of Schengen however, that only restricts citizens from Iceland and Norway from entering these nations without a visa – all other full EU members have no limitations. This could explain the Party for Freedom’s success in the Netherlands – not only are they part of Schengen; they also have one of the highest levels of immigration from EU and non-EU states per capita. Geert Wilders’ rhetoric exposes a rabid dislike of immigration – he advocated the removal of Romania and Bulgaria from the Union and is vociferously opposed to Turkish membership of the EU. His anti-Romanian sentiment could rest with the fact that the Romanian President has pledged to give approximately one million Romanian passports to Moldovan citizens who have Romanian heritage. The success of extremist parties across the Union must be addressed. The governments of the European Union countries now have the task of finding pragmatic solutions to the rise of nationalist support which threatens to destroy the bridges built since 1957.

French and Polish self-interest in all but name

The Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership were proposed by France and Poland respectively. Each country has presented these policies as a means of furthering the achievements of the European Union as a bloc and helping neighbours to achieve economic and democratic prosperity, however it appears that French and Polish interests are at the centre of these projects.

The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched by Nicolas Sarkozy on 13 July 2008. The main goal of the UfM is to modernise and develop upon the achievements (albeit, negligible) of the 1995 Barcelona Process. Membership comprises the 27 European Union nations and those of the Barcelona Process with the addition of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Libya, Mauritania, Monaco and Montenegro. One of Sarkozy’s possible reasons for bringing the Mediterranean to the fore of EU relations was that Europe’s target of 2 per cent of foreign direct investment in the region is inadequate in comparison to the 20 per cent and 25 per cent America and Japan invests in the countries south of their borders.

The key priorities of the UfM were detailed as: The de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; establishing transport links; coordinated approaches to tackling man-made disasters; creating a plausible solar energy plan; the establishment of a Euro-Med University and a business development forum for small and medium-sized companies. The project has set ambitious goals but already leaves itself open to criticism. The Union lacks a detailed policy on freedom of movement which is of primary importance to the southern countries. The UfM is chaired by two countries for biennial terms, one from Europe and one from North Africa – this arrangement is wide open to abuse as chairmen have a lengthy amount of time to only pursue their respective national interests in an already fractious region.

The Eastern Partnership (EP) was presented in 2008 by Poland and to a lesser extent Sweden, as a means of counterbalancing the Union for the Mediterranean. The EP launching summit with the member countries will be hosted on 7 May 2009. Poland supported the UfM on a proviso that Eastern neighbours would have access to a similar proposal. The EP aims to develop oil and gas routes around the Black Sea which do not fall within Russia’s sphere of influence, with the added intention of strengthening EU regional dialogue with neighbours Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus.

The EP aspires to the creation of a free-trade area for agricultural products and services; visa facilitation with the eventual prospect of visa-free travel and increased cooperation in transport, environmental and immigration affairs.

The EU already funds Eastern Partnership countries except Belarus for programmes under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument. The agreed funding between 2007- 2010 is; Armenia €98.4m, Azerbaijan €92m, Georgia €620.4m, Moldova €209.7m and Ukraine €494m. In 2008, Eastern European countries received a further €25.6m under the Cross Border Cooperation programme.

Both the UfM and the EP duplicate the intentions of the European Neighbourhood Policy, whereby neighbouring countries are offered closer cooperation and increased access to the EU single market in exchange for political and economic reforms. Not only have they been presented as progressive initiatives, they are also being used as vehicles by their countries of birth to pursue national interests.

The EU has failed to include agriculture in the UfM free-trade agreements even though the sector is of economic importance to southern Mediterranean countries. It has however, opened free-trade to service and industrial sectors where the southern nations struggle to compete with the EU’s prowess. This is glaringly counterproductive and may be attributed to French over-protectiveness of the agricultural sector.

It can be argued that France is using the Union for the Mediterranean to pursue its own interests and strengthen influence in her former colonies. In the week he delivered a speech in Tangier extolling the virtues of a Mediterranean union, President Sarkozy signed commercial contracts with Morocco worth €3bn. France has also offered to advise North African countries on nuclear power in exchange for access to the region’s gas reserves. The inclusion of Mauritania into the UfM is questionable – it is only partly in North Africa, has no direct access to the Mediterranean Sea and is for all intents and purposes a West African country.

Northern European countries, Germany and Austria in particular, were reluctant to fund a project they felt had such limited impact on their affairs. Sarkozy compromised on opening membership of the UfM to all EU members as a way of appeasing Chancellor Merkel and avoiding a split in the Franco- German alliance. This move was despite the fact that France and other southern EU member states have not been granted full membership of the Council of the Baltic Sea States. Sarkozy’s actions are possibly due to the fact that France’s position as the EU state of highest influence in the Union for the Mediterranean would not be threatened by her northern counterparts. Also, the UfM has further implications as it encompasses the protagonists of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is arguable that France realised it would need full EU cooperation if the UfM is to make progress in neutralising the ongoing disputes in the region, although it was supine during the recent hostilities.

It is also clear that Poland is keen to export its success at political transformation and eventual EU membership to its eastern neighbours, and is particularly loyal to her former colony Ukraine. Ukraine has been at the receiving end of conflicting statements as a member of the European Neighbourhood Policy. On the one hand, ENP countries are told that the policy is not a route to EU membership and on the other hand the EU’s High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana has referred to the ENP as a “comfortable waiting room” for future candidates.

The Eastern Partnership could help the EU to achieve (or at least appear to achieve) cordial relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. One way to ease tension would be to exploit the natural resources of both nations, thus forging strong trade links and reducing the dependency on Russian oil and gas supplies. This could be the reason why Eastern Partnership countries will have access to agricultural services and visa-free travel, whereby these options have not been made available to Union for the Mediterranean member states.

By proposing the EP, Poland has the opportunity to elevate herself in the EU and consolidate diplomatic relations with her eastern neighbours. The prospect of irritating Russia by engaging non-EU eastern European countries into an EU initiative was probably noted but ignored, which is arguably due to the partial Russian embargo on Polish food products.

The End of a Loveless Marriage: Cameron plans EPP exit

David Cameron has confirmed that he will honour the pledge he made during his 2005 Conservative Party leadership campaign to withdraw the Conservatives from the European People’s Party-European Democrats (EPP-ED) bloc in the European Parliament (EP). This announcement comes ahead of the June elections where the Party is expected to improve upon 2004’s performance. Cameron’s decision to sever the union with the EPP-ED after 17 years, is arguably due to the fact that the ideology harboured in the group differs markedly to that of the Conservative Party on fundamental issues such as, further European integration and a UK referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.

It can be inferred that the Conservatives have always been reluctant members of the bloc as a result of the fact that they joined the group due to the weakened position of the European Democrats in 1992. The rise of euroscepticism in the Conservative Party during the early 1990s, owing greatly to the Maastricht Treaty, heightened the fractious link between the Party and the EPP bloc.

The relationship between the bloc and the Party has been plagued by mistrust from the very beginning. The bloc rejected a membership application by Margaret Thatcher over concerns about the increase in eurosceptic sentiment in Britain. EPP membership remained attractive to John Major’s government as a result of the perceived benefits the Party would reap as part of a large group in the European Parliament, due to the legislature having increased powers through the Single European Act. The bloc’s name was changed to EPP-ED following the ratification of the Malaga Declaration in 1999. The Declaration also strengthened the right of Conservative MEPs to vote separately from other members in the new bloc. The Party continued its bid for greater influence within the bloc. In 2001, the then party leader Iain Duncan Smith made an unsuccessful appeal to the then EPP-ED leader Hans-Gert Poettering asking for an increased budget and greater freedom for Conservative MEPs to promote their policies within the group. In 2003, the Conservatives signed the Prague Declaration which stated the Party’s commitment to free enterprise and national sovereignty, which was in direct conflict with the EPP Basic Programme’s tenets of a federal Europe and support for the social market economy. Under Michael Howard’s leadership in 2004, the EPP-ED group’s constitution was modified to grant the ED with the freedom, “to promote and develop their distinct views on constitutional and institutional issues in the new Europe”.

In 2006, following his successful leadership campaign, David Cameron and Mirek Topolanek of the Czech Civic Democratic Party announced their intention to form a new group in the European Parliament after the 2009 elections. The Movement for European Reform was subsequently launched by the two leaders as a vehicle to developing their agenda independently from the European Parliament.

The Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) have confirmed their intention to join the Conservatives in a new centre-right bloc. Other potential members of this new group include; Latvians for Fatherland and Freedom (LNNK) who are opposed to a federal Europe and currently sit in the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) bloc; the Centre Party of Finland (KESK) who favour decentralisation and sit in the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) bloc; Irish disability rights campaigner Kathy Sinnott who currently sits in the Independence and Democracy (IND/DEM) bloc; the Swedish June List Party who also sit in the IND/DEM bloc; and the Spanish People’s Party (PP) whose 24 MEPs currently sit in the EPP-ED.

The influence wielded by the two largest parties in the EP, the EPP-ED and the Party of European Socialists (PES) is indisputable. Not only do they gain the majority of committee chairmanships, they also determine a significant number of the votes in the Conference of Presidents which sets the plenary agendas and jurisdiction of parliamentary committees. Membership of the larger groups is advantageous as their support is required in order to achieve an absolute majority under the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure. The EP uses the D’Hondt principle of the list electoral system to allocate positions. The D’Hondt system is inherently biased in favour of larger groups and as a result, contributes to the overwhelming influence of the EPP-ED and the PES in the European Parliament.

It can be argued that the Conservative Party’s departure from the EPP-ED group was inevitable. David Cameron was not the first leadership candidate in 2005 to make this declaration, Liam Fox also vowed to remove the Party from the bloc. The Conservative position within the EPP-ED bloc can be perceived as untenable due to the disparity in party and group ideology on key principles such as sovereignty and deeper integration. The potential for the Conservatives to pursue a divergent agenda whilst remaining within the group would be difficult to achieve. The Conservatives’ modest performance in the 2004 elections can be attributed to the fact that the Party made a commitment to curb further integration whilst retaining membership of the pro-integration EPP-ED bloc. The Party’s opinions are stifled by the majority of MEPs in the group who favour further harmonisation, therefore, breaking free from the shackles of the ‘ever closer union’ enthusiasts could be perceived as the most effective way to pursue the Party’s agenda. The Conservatives’ departure from the bloc after the 2009 elections will be perceived as a hindrance to the Group in the sense that Conservative membership makes a significant contribution in terms of achieving policy and strategic goals through rapporteurships, voting weight and potential leadership roles. Forming a new group has the added fiscal benefit of an aggregate budget of £5million which could be used to promote the new bloc’s objectives.

The new group may challenge the EPP-ED’s dominance of the centre-right if it is successful in attracting established parties such as the Spanish People’s Party. It is no coincidence that the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS) and the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) are the only confirmed members of the Conservatives’ new group and also happen to belong to countries that have yet to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon.

Is Croatia the answer to the Lisbon Question?

Croatia began its EU membership campaign with discussions in 2005, and hopes to gain full status as a member by 2011. These efforts were stymied in 2008 when Slovenia blocked the opening of further accession chapters to Croatia on regional policy and the co-ordination of structural instruments; the free movement of capital; the environment; and justice. Slovenia used her power of veto as a conduit to resolving the 18-year disputes with Croatia which include fishing rights, land and sea borders. Croatia has ignited Slovenia’s fury by submitting maps to Brussels which the latter has stated prejudge the two countries’ borders. These disagreements began after both countries declared their independence from the former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991.

An area of contention is the Bay of Piran which Slovenia asserts is preventing its people from gaining direct access to international waters, a claim which Croatia’s chief accession negotiator, Vladimir Drobnjak has described as “without merit”.

Croatia’s decision in 2008 to suspend the implementation of the Protected Ecological Fishery Zone to EU members, following a request from the European Commission, was viewed as an initiative to maintain cordial relations with existing EU members Slovenia and Italy.

The Commission has taken the view that this conflict is a bilateral matter and cannot form part of Croatia’s membership negotiations. Although the Commission aims to uphold its position of neutrality (by stating that this border disagreement should not delay Croatia’s membership bid) it is inadvertently accusing Slovenia of unfairly obstructing Croatia’s EU ambitions.

Croatia believes that this dispute should be resolved by referring it to the International Court of Justice, however, Slovenia has stated that it is not prepared to follow this route. Both Croatia and Slovenia have now accepted the proposal by the European Union for a mediation group, tasked with the aim of resolving the existing dispute. The mediation group will be led by Finland’s former President Martti Ahtisaari. Croatia was initially apprehensive about this proposal but agreed to it on the 9thMarch 2009, on a proviso that the disagreement would be eventually settled in the International Court of Justice. Slovenia has maintained her reluctance at taking the dispute to The Hague.

This decision by the EU to intervene in bilateral conflicts between Member States and aspiring members, places the Union in a compromising position as the degree to which mediation progresses - and the decisions reached - will invariably set a precedent in future negotiations between candidates and Member States. Although relations between Croatia and Slovenia have been amicable, there is a plausible risk that this could change irrespective of the denouement.

The Commission must now decide on the extent to which they will intervene in territorial disputes between EU Member States and countries with EU aspirations in the future. The Croat-Slovene disagreement is matched by friction between Greece and Macedonia, and Cyprus and Turkey – where Member States are deciding the fate of candidate countries with whom they have outstanding grievances.

It can be argued that EU overtures to Croatia and Slovenia may be due to the fact that these two countries have the potential to solve the Lisbon Treaty dilemma. With four Member States yet to sign the Treaty, namely Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic and Ireland, there is a chance that Lisbon will not be ratified in 2009 thus paving the way for the Treaty to be integrated into Croatia’s accession treaty. In order to ensure that this scenario remains a viable option, Slovenia must lift her veto so that Croatia can complete all accession negotiations by the end of 2009.